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SEMIOTICS AND HISTORY 
Entering a no-go zone with Patrick Wolfe 
BOB HODGE AND VIJAY MISHRA 
This piece of writing was set off by Patrick Wolfe's review of Dark 
Side of the Dream (Mtanjin 2/1992), but we hasten to insist that we 
don't propose to defend ourselves or the book from Wolfe'~ review. 
Whether or not he was right about the worth of the book is neither 
here nor there. beyond the bruises inflicted on tWO sensitive 
authorial egos who ought to have known what they were in for when 
they published their book. But the issues that Wolfe raises deserve 
wider debate. 
First, he constructs the djfference he sees between himself and us 
as an instance of the irreconcilable gulf between semiotics and 
history. Secondly, he proposes what hf~ calls an 'epistemological 00-
go zone' around all Aboriginal meanings, which no 'invader' should 
cross, and especially no semiotician. We worry that the war he 
wants to declare between history and semiotics may be a distraction 
from the difficult issues of the larger muggle in which he and we 
and many others are engaged, as academics against a racist Aus-
tralia. In this war we ate not sure that Ii strict epistemological no-go 
zone is the only (or the best) tactic that non-Aboriginal academics 
can come up with to support the efforts of our Aboriginal brothers 
and sisters. 
Wolfe is generous about the semiotic competence of our book, 
praising its 'interpretive vignettes'(33), but he is severe on its 
incompetence as history: 'At one level, this book contains a numbet 
of empirical errors of a type that historians, for all their possible 
semiotic shortcomings, simply do not make' (334). He then illus-
trates this heavy charge: 
for instance, Hodge and Mishra date Australia's 'shift from Britain 
to the US as its guarantor' from Holt's 'All the Way with LB)' (6), in 
apparent ignorance of Curtin's declaration a quartet of a century 
earlier that Australia's primary interests lay with MacArthur in the 
Pacific. (334). 
877 
We can take a just tebuke, so we turned dutifully to see what we 
had written in order to properly regret it. It came in a paragraph 
that took Australia's involvement in (he Vietnam Wac as a focal 
point. It went: 
As we survey the four decades of Australian history since the second 
world war this seems to us a symptomatic and decisive event. 
Initially the Australian government enthusiastically supported the 
US: 'All the Way with 1BJ was the catch-cry of Australian Prime 
Minister Harold Holt, a cringe so fulsome that it returned to haunt 
the pro-war movement. (6) 
As we look at this statement again, it doesn't seem very empirical, 
but then it's not trying to be. We go on to call Holt's speech 'one 
extreme development', nOt the first, and we're not attempting co 
'date' Australia's shift to the American alliance. 'Dates' are nice 
empirical things, about which you can be right or wrong, depend-
ing on whether you're a historian or not. Ironically, a real empirical 
error would have been to include Curtin (1885-1945) in a discussion 
of postwar Australia, as Wolfe the historian castigares us for nOt 
doing. 
At the risk of seeming pedantically censorious, we want co 
suggest thar Wolfe's criticism here stems from a,specific kind of 
error that is sadly common among professional hisrorians. He 
doesn't read welL Or to be more precise, he has been trained in a 
technology of reading that is good at producing 'history' (text that is 
acceptable to professional historians) but doesn't produce 'good 
readings' by ocher standards of accuracy and precision. Perhaps he is 
simply unable to comprehend relatively simple pieces of prose like 
this when he reads them the first time, but it is more likely that 
behind his 'error' is his method of reading, one that abstracts key 
phrases from a larger text and incorporates them into another text, 
his notes, which are then recycled into the continuous prose of his 
review. In this new text the fragments from the prior text have no 
constraining context, so that Wolfe can shuffle them around and 
produce a new text, of which he is the unsuspecting author, but 
which he attributes to (he original author and text. In this way the 
historian's reading method produces an 'empirical error', which the 
hisrorian then exposes and castigates, while we semioticians look on 
in awe and amazement at our irrelevance to the whole performance. 
In case we seem to be scoring easy points at the expense of 
history, we should add that the second 'empirical error' that Wolfe 
detects is a different matter. He criticizes us (334) for 'get{ting) the 
current official definition of Aboriginality wrong' by leaving OUt the 
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crucial final part of the quotation. What is ironic about this is that 
our description (though not offered as a definition or quotation) is 
incomplete, as he says - precisely the fault that we have just said 
was the product of historical methods of reading. We could try to be 
smart here. and claim that we were only aspiring to be historians, 
but it's not our aim to continue a polemic between history and 
semiotics. The part not quoted was not relevant to our argument at 
that point, and we did not claim to be recording the official 
definition of Aboriginality. Even so, we could and should have 
completed the quotation. It wasn't an 'empirical error', but it was 
an offense against semiotic protocols, and Wolfe the semiotic 
historian was on solid ground in rebuking us. 
As this shows, Wolfe is really a semiotician in historian's 
clothing. The giveaway is the key phrase 'epistemological no-go 
zone', which no self-respecting proper historian would use (combin-
ing the polysyllabic 'epistemological' with 'no-go', which has a 
monosyllabic populi.sm that historians would not touch). His 
assault on our historical credentials, it turns out, was a feint. The 
real attack is mounted by Wolfe the crypto-semiotician against the 
conditions of our semiotic enterpris~~, exposing the contradictions 
that we struggled with throughout our text, but failed to resolve, 
according to this harsh but entirely competent judge. 
But Waite is not kind about the semiotic enterprise. He is worth 
quoting extensively on this theme (for those who haven't read the 
issue of Meanjin in which it appears): 
Semiotics insatiably aspires ro a thoroughgoing penetration. 
Semiotics' invasive nature resides in its panoptic scope: nothing can 
escape being turned into communication for the analyst to appropri-
ate, interrogate and reconstruct. The result is a compulsory dialogue 
in which the analyst arrogates a power that not even the police dare 
(openly, at any rare) ro claim. In rhis dialogic frogmarch, invaded 
subjects are refused rhe option of not speaking. Worse, they are even 
made to speak unawares, in contexts where they could reasonably 
believe that they were doing something else entirely. For semiotics, 
a cigar is never just a cigar. (337-8) 
In this horrific vision, semiotics is both insatiable rapist and 
oppressive thought police. No person and no place is safe from its 
surveillance and. unlike the police verbal. semiotics never fails to 
get a confession. The climactic indignity, it seems, is that a person 
can't even have a smoke in peace without semiotics telling you what 
it is that you're really doing. Moreover this is an insider's parody, as 
shown by the allusions to Foucault ('panoptic{on]') and Eco ("cigar' 
for 'pipe'). Wolfe knows whereof he speaks. 
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Such is the passion and desperation of this passage that we fear 
that Wolfe really feels this irrational terror in the company of 
semioticians. To give the technical psychological term, he is a 
semiophobe, which is quite compatible with being a latent semio-
tician. He is personally defending himself from his own semiotic 
dark self, as well as defending history from an invasion by aliens: 
semioticians as body-snatchers. Sadly, in his sickness he will 
doubdess read the present caring and compassionate diagnosis as 
further proof that semioticians take innocent denunciations and turn 
them into signs and symptoms. In the next scene in this nightmate 
he will be taken away and incarcerated in a Home for Historians, 
inhabited by sane historians who have been certified by crazed but 
all-powerful semioticians who confiscate their cigars. 
So once again we hasten to teassure him that this whole opposi-
tion is misconceived. A good case can be made that semiotics and 
history have complementary blind spotS in their reading strategies: 
semioticians tend to get too much from reading too few texts, where 
historians get too little from reading too many. Ways of reading are 
not mere techniques that can be easily learnt or unlearnt. They are 
bound up with the ideology of a discipline, part of the construction 
of an individual identity as historian or semiotician. But the 
boundaries around twO adjacent areas such as history and semiotics 
can be transgtessed, as many interdisciplinary forays have shown, 
without jeopardizing the integrity and permanence of the twO 
established disciplines. Semioricians and historians must be able to 
work together on topics of common interest, to their mutual 
benefic. In the 1990s this is surely a benign and uncontroversial 
proposal, if still a Utopian one. 
But Wolfe's concern is with one specific enterprise: where Abo-
rigines become the objects of the academic gaze. Where his carica-
ture of semiotics would not matter roo much (excepr to historians) if 
the only people threatened by its imperialist gaze were historians, it 
js different jf this supremely invasive discipline is let loose on 
Aboriginal people. That is the burden of his concern, and it is by no 
means an unimportant issue. 
Wolfe uses twO stron"g words for our approach: 'invade' and 
'assimilationist'. These words refer to two disgraceful phases in 
European-Aboriginal relationships in Australian history. Wolfe 
takes these metaphors seriously, as accurate labels for the politics of 
our approach, to connect our work with practices that we deplore as 
much as he does, as he acknowledges. As historians we have one 
problem with this tactic. 'Assimilation' in this context tefers to a 
historically specif]c phase in Australian government policies towards 
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Aboriginal people. The word was a euphemism for various genoci-
dal practices. including the abduction of children and large-scale 
deprivation of rights. The word is highly emotive, Its strong 
connotations include blatant hypocrisy and fundamental hostility to 
Aboriginal people. We don't feel ir is useful to use it indiscrimi-
nately to condemn all projects that envisage some kind of co-
existence or co-operation between Aborigines and non-Aboriginal 
Australia. Used in this broad-brush way it applies also to Wolfe's 
most valuable work. His own labours to set up Aboriginal Studies at 
Melbourne University could equally be labelled 'assimilationist' if 
we wanted to scote points, but we believe too much in the value and 
difficulty of what he is doing to use this tactic against him. 
As semioticians we have a different response. Semiotics isn't in 
facr a monolithic enterprise devoted to getting illicit confessions 
from innocent texts. This may have been half true of an early phase 
of semiotics, which we would call euphoric semiotics, typified 
especially by the early Barthes and to a lesser extent by Levi-Strauss 
in the 1950s and 1960s. The dominant form of semiotics now is 
post-structuralist. In different ways the work of such figures as 
Derrida, Kristeva, Foucault and Said has exposed the politics of 
texrualiey to the analytic gaze, problematizing the acts of reading 
and writing so thoroughly that there is no longer a place outside 
textuality and outside politics that can guarantee the innocence of 
any act of writing. From this point of view we may query the terms 
Wolfe has used, but we cannot claim to be unaware or innocent of 
the basic charge. Our book struggles with a contradiction so 
intrinsic that we could not have hoped to transcend it, Thus far, 
Wolfe is right. But our choice was not between innocence or guilt. 
It was between the guilt of writing or the guilt of silence. Guilt is 
not optional: it comes with the territory. 
As we survey the field of academic production on 'Aboriginal 
studies', we do nOt note an excess of works by semioticians. The 
short list of significant books would .include work by Muecke and 
Clunies Ross, and Mudrooroo's important book. The investment by 
historians is far more substantial, starting with the monumental 
work of Rowley, including fine books by Broome, Reynolds, 
Haebich and Evans. There is a journal called Aboriginal HiJtory, but 
no equivalent journal in Aboriginal semiotics. Where Wolfe worries 
about the invasion of the semioticians, we worry about their 
indifference to this topic. 
Wolfe proposes an 'epistemological no-go zone'. There is a tcace 
of asymmetry about this injunction: it's apparently aimed at 
semioticians and theic like, but has an addition in small print: '(but 
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historians are OK),. Even so, we respect its intent. 'Speak when 
you're spoken to', Wolfe commands, with a brutal authority he has 
acquired from some unstated source. But there are still some 
problems with implementing this directive. How big is this no-go 
zone? Where are its boundaries? What are the rules for admission 
(given that some non-Aborigines, i.e. some historians, are to be 
admitted) and who is to administer them? It might seem obvious 
that Aborigines alone should do so, but in this case we see that 
Wolfe, a historian but not an Aborigine, can take it upon himself to 
teli us to clear off and not come back. Perhaps he's right, and we 
should depart without waiting (0 ask the views of any Aborigines. If 
this no-go zone is absolute, it can be policed by enthusiastic non-
Aborigines without further input from Aboriginal people. That is 
precisely the danger of such an absolute proposal. 
As an instance of the value of a more co-operative attitude 
between semiotics and history, we'll take the example of the fine 
article 'Nothing has Changed' by Koori historian Tony Birch in the 
same issue of Meanjin. This article was an intervention in a 
contested history, focused on a disputed act of naming in the 
GariwerdiGrampians mountains. As such it drew on historians 
(Bruce Scates and Rae Frances, Manning Clark, Chilla Bulbeck, 
M. Christie) and semioticians (Graeme Turner, Paul Carter, Steve 
Mickler, James Clifford, J. B. Hartley) to suppOrt a Koori argument 
about the significance of places, and Koori rights to interpret their 
own landscape, their own culture and history. Some of these 
academics may be unwilling allies (Carter in his article in the same 
issue could be read as hostile to the Koori campaign in this 
instance), but they have been used nevertheless. In Birch's article, 
Koori voices are not silenced by these supportive non-Aboriginal 
voices, and other voices - bigoted whites from the district - are also 
allowed or made to speak, so that the living reality of prejudice is 
entered on the record. This polyphony, managed by Birch, does nOt 
negate Kooris' speaking rights. On the contrary, it is an essential 
condition for them to be effective. 
This brings out the biggest problem with Wolfe's 'no-go zone' 
proposal: only academics sympathetic to Aboriginal interests will 
respect it. As a gesture of purity it is impeccable, but as a tactic it's 
suspiciously like an own goal. If it were really possible to create a 
total silence among all others, in which only Aboriginal voices 
could speak, then the struggle would be over and there would be no 
need for the ban. Outside academia if not within it, Birch shows 
that the dominant construction of Aborigines and history is still 
racist, perpe.mating into the present the consequences of the inva-
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sion and the subsequent discriminatory policies. Koori people need 
allies. But Birch goes on to make a point that reinforces Wolfe's 
argument, The original proposal co rename the district did nOt call 
on local Kooris for their knowledge and views, The motives for the 
name change included a wish to package Aboriginality as touristic 
commodity, and the government's apparently pro-Aboriginal stance 
did not involve respect for the views or involvement of Aboriginal 
people whose hiscory and country this was. Wolfe's criticism of the 
omnipresent pseudo-dialogue of Aboriginalism is still very perti-
nent: we make the same point ourselves many times (see for example 
pp. 37, 40-1, 78-9). 
Our 'reply' should perhaps close on this nOte of almost tOtal 
agreement with Wolfe. We are acutely aware of the contradiction at 
the core of our enterprise. This contradiction is not JUSt a lapse of 
attention on our part, a gross example of academic bad faith, Nor is 
Wolfe's injunction irrelevant to us as a guideline for our practice. 
His criticism raises issues that need to be debated again and again, 
in case anyone supposes that there is an easy solution to the 
dilemma, In our book we tried co cbe as scrupulous as we could, 
while still taking the risk of speech, 
No doubt we have sometimes lapsed, though Wolfe doesn't point 
out any individual instances (perhaps held back by a sudden attack 
of courtesy or compassion). But academics in Australia (like Wolfe 
and ourselves) have a role as public intellectuals. Given White 
Australia's record, past and present, in its treatment of Aboriginal 
people. too many still remain silent, leaving the majority view 
uncontested. We hope that our book, for all its contradictions, will 
help co make space on one part of the curriculum, the 'English' 
syllabus, for more Aboriginal texts and Aboriginal voices in schools 
and universities. That is not at all to discount the need to make the 
same kinds of space elsewhere in the curriculum, including history 
and social studies. If Aboriginal people tell us that it is having the 
opposite effect, we would agree that Wolfe is right, and that our 
book should never have been written. 
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